Welfare State by Graycar, Adam
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons: 
http://dspace.flinders.edu.au/dspace/ 
A paper by Professor Adam Graycar, Social Welfare 
Research Centre, University of New South Wales:
"Welfare State"
presented at the Western Australian Council of 
Social Services, Perth, 22nd December 1982
Copyright © University of New South Wales. 
This speech is made available under the Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial, No 
Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
/ 
Adam Graycar 
History of social welfare as old as history of human race, history of 
W.S. much more recent phenomenon. Welfare State born with golden future 
ahead of it - political mechanism which could hope for elimination of want, 
ignorance, squalor, disease, idleness - temper inequalities arising from 
social and industrial structures. Hopes around corner, 1960s/70s was a 
new era characterized by distributive justice, maximum feasible participation, 
social supports which would maximise self worth and dignity, minimise stigma 
and create an equitable and just society. 
The corner was never turned. Econ downturn used to shape retreat but 
as times tough W.S. attracted by left and right 
L hasn't lived up to redistributive ideals - hasn't 
eliminated poverty, squalor 
R - vJasteful, inefficient and morally repugnant. 
What we are seeing is a retreat (reorientation) in legitimacy in 
economically difficult times. 
The \4elfare State, wrote Rudolf Klein, is the residual beneficiary of 
the 'Growth State'. In Australia, which in the early 1980s was experiencing 
the most severe recession for half a century, the term 'growth state' could 
not be applied to a situation of limited growth in Gross Domestic Product; 
of high and unevenly distributed unemployment; of persistently high 
inflation; of high levels of personal income tax in a system where wage and 
salary earners pay a disproportionate share of the nation's taxes; of 
receding company profits; of the virtual collapse of manufacturing industry; 
and of crippling interest rates. While much of business is in the doldrums 
2. 
the position of the poorest and most vulnerable has deteriorated markedly, 
and their life chances have diminished so that as they face the mid to 
late 1980s their outlook is characterised by uncertainty and exclusion. 
Those facing this exclusion head on, cut a swathe right through our society, 
but vulnerability seems most heavily concentrated in those excluded from 
the labour force and from the housing market and those forced into 
situations of dependency either by virtue of age or disability or by 
virtue of class and gender rleations. 
How legitimate are the claims made by these people? How capable is 
our community in reacting to this. My argument is that organizations like 
WACOSS must engage in activities and maintain pressure so that Government 
cannot accelerate the retreat. 
For government to operate authoritatively it must have extractive, 
regulative and distributive capabilities, as well as be responsive to 
community interests. 
Extractive - skills of population 
- extraction of taxation 
Regulative - always in doubt - too much - argument is about complexity 
and interdependence, much argument for deregulation 
Distributive - Cash, services, life chances 
Community interests - pressure group activity 
Extractive, Regulative and Distributive capacities influence the three 
types of welfare systems 
- social services 
- occup $5 bi 11 ion 
- fiscal tax 
in SWRC studying these 3 3 levels 
a) people and characterists 
b) institutions 
c) macro 
To help understand retreat we must understand some aspects of our 
population structure 
AGED 
ageing 
children 
welfare 
disabled etc. 
9.6% today by 2030 14% ageing slowly - most Europe 17 
Life expectancy M 47 - 70 
F 51 - 77 
achievement, not calamity but each day 300 turn 65 
194 die 
i.e. 106 per day or 39,000 per year - services, income. 
but old, old - female 36% today of 65+ are 75+ 
46% in 2000 will be 75+ 
54 per JOO over 65 female 
71 per 100 over 80 female 
3. 
For example? it may seem trite to mention that most elderly males have a 
spouse and most elderly females do not have a spouse. This has 
ramifications for living arrangements and for care patterns. 
Children 
Many of the losers in tough economic times are children a dee] ine 
in family income, a decline in services. 
In particular, around 10% of Austral la's families are single parent 
families and in these families there are over 400,000 children. Whereas 
4. 
l .4% of two parent families rely for their incomes on government social 
security benefits and the figure amojg single parent families is 42%. 
Children, particularly those in single parent families are mong the poorest 
people in our society. Part of feminization of poverty. 
Illness and Disability 
45% of wholepopulation experiences chronic illness 
For every 1000 persons, 803 chronic illnesses, for every 1000 eldery 
people, 1800 chronic conditions. Approximately 1 .3 mill ion Australians 
have disabilities which are handicaps. Over½ mill ion severely disabled 
(most 1 ive at home - implications for family care and services). 
Employment and Unemployment 
\~e all know the disasterous and rapid growth in employment and the 
duration of unemployment. I won't go through the data on our labour 
force except - Concentration of unemployment 8% - 22% 
Feminisation/Qua] ifications 
lnval id pensions - men 50 - 59 rose 152%. These and other factors. 
s. 
The 1980s will be a decade of dee! ining economic growth, steady or 
declining pub! ic resources and increased demands on those resources, 
Uncertainty and exclusion will be the lot of many people in the 1980s -
people who find they cannot get an income in the labour market; people 
whose education does not buy them a place in the job market; people whose 
skills have been undermined by technological change; people whose 
occupations have been rendered obsolete by structural adjustment; family 
heads who receive insufficient infrastructure support to maintain their 
families; women whose productive value is disregarded and who are 
confined to a state of dependenc~; people who have difficulty in achieving 
satisfaction in housing, services, or income, and young people who 
believe they have no worthwhile place in a competitive industrial society. 
These groups cover much of the population and will make claims for a share 
of Australia's welfare state in the 1980s. The conditions of Australia's 
vulnerable and poorest people - those persons with insufficient income, 
services and power by virtue of their disabilities, isolation, ethnicity 
and lack of life chances - will need humane attention. 
This is despite the fact that DSS spends over $11 bill ion p.a. on 
income maintenance - around $32 mill ion per day or $1 .3 mil I ion per hour. 
This $32 mill ion per day has not prevented almost 2 mill ion people 
from falling below a very austere poverty 1 ine, the majority of whom are 
income support recipients. 
Changing patterns of dependency, not all of which can be met by 
income support system 
income support system has limitations and hence retreat from W.S. 
characterised by turn towards NGWOs and families as support and service 
systems. 
Privatization of welfare: seeking - private solutions to pub] ic 
problems. 
37,000 NGWOs in Australia as well as expectations that families play 
strong caring role. 
Great vaiety of patterns in NGWOs re funding and services. 
Of the 37,000 big business 
:,big bur 
About 4000 NGWOs have budgets over$½ mill ion 
About 12000 NG\~Os have budgets under $5000 
About 16000 NGWOs have budgets under $10,000 
About 14000 get nothing from government 
About 8000 get more than 3/4 of their budgets from government 
About 5000 NGWOs get something from government, but less than $5000 -
hoops 
Most tending for dep. family members provided by families - tremendous 
burdens - women in the middle but potential careforce diminishing. 
l. Of those forming families in the mid-19th century, 80% had four or 
6. 
more children. Of those presently in their seventies, approximately 
25% have had four or more children. 
children or only one child. 
Furthermore about 30% have no 
7. 
2. Traditionally a pool of middle-aged unmarried women not in the labour 
force could be counted upon to provide care. Today there are fewer 
11 never marrieds 11 in Australia than ever before. Of women aged 45 
to 59, 22% in 1901 were never married, Today the proportion is 4.8%. 
For every 100 elderly persons, there were, in 1901, 8,7 unmarried 
women aged 45-59. Today there are 4. l. 
3, Labour force participation rates for women have increased in the past 
decade from 39% to 45%. For married women aged 45-54 the 1980 labour 
force participation rate was 44.4% (50.7% for unmarried women). For 
those aged 55-59 the rate was 27% (and 34.4% for unmarried women). 
Family care can be seen as a cheap alternative, a means by which 
families can provide (at little or no cost to the state) services otherwise 
financed by the taxpayer. This leads to the point that family care cuts 
across any element of equality between the sexes, in pnactice care by the 
family equals care by women. An increase in overall dependency can result 
if we develop the idea that in the future women can provide care for their 
relatives because they will in any case be at home, financially dependent 
on a man. This seems a very shaky basis on which to plan the expansion of 
care, when we examine our demographic and labour force data. 
The key lies in NGWOs - major providers, but insufficiently developed 
in partnership with government. NGWOs are not private bodies and need to 
tie into a closer partnership. they need both to plan and provide, and 
keep on governments back to harrass mercilessly to make sure it performs 
its extractive, regulative and distributive roles, 
8. 
The Australian welfare state is faced with issues, not of survival, 
but of alliance. Which groups will combine together to form a protective 
support for the vulnerable; which coal it ions will strive for tax fairness 
and interference into market mechanism, so that inequality is not manified; 
which coal it ions wil I fight for the maintenance and improvement of benefits 
to ensure that the politics of exclusion is not directed at those with the 
fewest political resources; which coal it ions will ensure that a reasonable 
balance be struck and maintained between the public and private spheres of 
allocation? These are the political issues which will shape the future of 
social welfare. As David Donnison pointed out, social welfare is not an 
•unproductive frill tacked onto the economy as a charitable afterthought 1 
but an i nteg ra I part of any modern economy. 
Needs requiring social care are found throughout society. Despite 
contemporary rhetoric, families may have the willingness, but not the 
capacity to provide the high I ivel care required by dependent relatives. 
The voluntary sector is too diffuse and diverse to plan and develop and 
de] iver the bulk of the services. The statutory sector has the bulk of 
the resources and the authority to develop comprehensive and equitable 
policies for the expansion of social care. Politicians who stress the 
virtues of family care are either unaware of the costs to families of 
providing that care or are cynically expecting a major shift in social 
provision and social resources with the result that those least able to 
provide adequately will find greater burdens thrust upon them. The 1980 1 s 
will require greater state intervention, and the role of the voluntary 
sector wil I require exceptional perception, astuteness and empathy in the 
ability to identify problems, relate them to intervention systems, and 
work towards linking the appropriate balance of statutory, voluntary, and 
informal services, in an attempt to reverse the retreat from the W.S. 
